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ABSTRACT
Static Analysis of Malicious Java Applets
by Nikitha Ganesh
In this research, we consider the problem of detecting malicious Java applets,
based on static analysis. In general, dynamic analysis is more informative, but static
analysis is more efficient, and hence more practical. Consequently, static analysis is
preferred, provided we can obtain results comparable to those obtained using dynamic
analysis. We conducted experiments with the machine learning technique, Hidden
Markov Model (HMM). We show that in some cases a static technique can detect
malicious Java applets with greater accuracy than previously published research that
relied on dynamic analysis.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Malware, which is a term used in short for malicious software, is used to steal
personal data and credentials of an individual. It is also used to manipulate the
data and online banking transactions. Manipulating the data can create a lot of
trouble, ranging from inappropriate message displaying to the deletion of files and
drives. It is also capable of launching denial of service attacks. To infect a system,
malware developers can use social engineering techniques [1] in tricking the user into
executing the program, or even without user interaction [18] they can exploit security
vulnerabilities to acquire access to a system. Gameover Zeus and Cryptolocker are
popular malwares that are dangerous and mainly targets the data in finance [20].
As well, we should also pay attention and be careful with a lot of other types and
variants of credentials stealing Trojans [20].
In the internet environment, Zeus family is one among the most advanced
credential-stealing Trojans [20]. The Zeus/Zbot Trojan which belongs to Zeus family
are known by many other names like PRG and Infostealer. This family of virus has
the record of infecting around 3.6 million systems in the United States. In 2009,
the statistics says that the Zeus family had infected more than 70,000 bank accounts
including the businesses or organizations such as NASA and the Bank of America.
In simple terms software vulnerabilities can be explained as a security flaw or
like a glitch found in a software. It can lead to many security concerns. More
often we hear about vulnerabilities with respect to client software, for example, email
applications and web browsers. These client software can be exploited by malicious
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programs. An attacker could exploit these in a number of ways depending on the
behavior of the applications, for example by using a specially crafted email attachment
or by persuading the user to visit a website which performs malicious activities.
Web browsers are the usual targets. Other well known targets are Adobe Acrobat
applications, Quick Time player, Macro-media flash and Java Run-time Environment.
Web browsers are particularly of interest when it comes to software vulnerability.
This is because it allows the exploiters to interact with the victim even before actually
infecting the browser. For example, an attacker can target the applications like Real
Player, Quick Time, or even the victim’s Antivirus program, that the browser uses
to properly render a website. Also, an attacker can submit a malicious JavaScript
request or Java Applet to the browser. This is used to determine which plugins are
installed and thus which exploit could be used against a particular target. Once the
application is compromised, a creative attacker can get access to the user’s browsing
history, or to the information which is currently present in user’s screen or clipboard.
That information can include the user’s credentials like the username and password
or even the credit card details.
The Java applets, like the typical Java applications consists of a groups of com-
piled Java classes. They are usually bundled in a jar archive. Java applets are
typically embedded inside HTML pages, explicitly specifying the main class as well
as additional parameters that should be provided to the applet as attributes. The
important part here is the host must be protected from unrestricted access. So the
Java applets are subjected to a security manager. The first thing the malicious ap-
plets does is, it tries to disable this security manager, thus allowing them to access
the restricted resources in the system.
Our goal here is to perform static analysis of Java applets using Hidden Markov
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Model. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) will serve as our measure of success.
We will compare our results to those obtained using a dynamic analysis techniques
similar to that in [12] on the same test set.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of malware and
its detection techniques, as well an overview of applets and its essentials. Chapter 3
gives the details of Hidden Markov Model. Chapter 4 explains code obfuscation and
its techniques. Chapter 5 gives an overview of static and dyamic analysis and also
the discussion of relevant work to which we are compering our results. Chapter 6
explains the relevant work in the project and the experimental results. Furthermore,
Chapter 7 gives the conclusion and the future work related to this project.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
This chapter consists of introduction to malware, the malware detection tech-
niques, followed by overview of applets, its essentials and how to execute it.
2.1 Malware
Malware is a set of instructions designed or programmed by the attackers, which
when run on the computer system, makes the system to behave in an abnormal way.
It makes the system to behave like how the attacker wants it to behave. Usually
they are intended to break software security of a system. The malicious activities
of these malware range from a simple prank to creating harm to a computer. Once
these malware infects, if we do not want data loss, then these malwares should be
identified and removed using antivirus software.
Some typical categories of malware are viruses, worms, trojan horse or trojan.
We can also find other categorization of viruses like rabbit, spyware, trapdoor or
backdoor. The explanation and differences of each of these categories of malware is
given in [28].
The first computer virus was created in 1986. It was called the Brain virus. It was
developed to infect the boot sector of the storage media. Virus creation and detection
methodologies have evolved to a greater extent ever since Brain virus was created.
Malware can also be a source of generating money for a malware developer [22].
Malware developers develop malwares which try to evade detection from popular
detection techniques. Once a virus evades an anti-virus system and manages to infect
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quite a large number of computers, the techniques of virus detection are usually
updated so that further infection is detected and hence avoided.
2.2 Malware detection techniques
It is not possible to build a perfect virus/malware detector. We can build the de-
tectors to detect signatures which can be considered as fingerprint like. We can build
the detectors to detect changes and anomalies, and also which can detect by perform-
ing static analysis or similarity analysis. Likewise, we can use different characteristics
of malware in a variety of detection techniques. The following sub-sections will give
more details of general approaches that are usually used to detect the malware.
2.2.1 Signature based detection
It is the most common and well-known method that antivirus software uses to
identify a program or an application as malware. When files in a system are scanned
for viruses, it checks the files against virus signatures present in the dictionary. The
dictionary contains the signatures of previously known viruses. A signature [28] is
a set of bits or a string of bits that are found in a file, which might also include
wildcards. A hash value could also serve as a signature.
This method is very effective in detecting previously known malwares and for
those malwares where a common signature can be easily extracted. Also this method
has minimum overhead on users and administrators, since the only work to be done
here is to maintain the file in which signatures are stored by keeping them up to date.
A fundamental problem with this method of detection is that we can only detect
the known signatures, i.e., we can detect only previously known malware. Even a
slight variant of a known virus might be missed.
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2.2.2 Change based detection
In this method if we detect that there is a change somewhere on a system, then
it may imply that the system has been infected by the virus. Usually the changes are
determined with the use of the hash functions. It works as follows. Compute hashes
of all files present on the system and securely store those hash values in a file. After
regular intervals we can compute the hashes of those files again and compare the new
hash values with those stored in the file before. If any file has changed in the order of
one or more bits we can notice that the hash value computed for that will not match
the previously computed one for that particular file.
Fundamental advantage in this method is that we can detect previously unknown
malware. However, a major disadvantage is that there are more chances of false
positives since files on a system keep changing very often. This can be considered as
an overhead on the part of users and administrators.
2.2.3 Anomaly based detection
This technique is used in determining any unusual activity caused by malwares.
The challenge with respect to this detection technique is to find out what is supposed
to be normal and what is not, and importantly, being able to distinguish between the
two. A major difficulty which arises here is, the definition of what is fixed as normal
for now might change in the future, and the system must have the capacity to adapt
to the changing definition.
The main advantage of this detection method is that we can possibly detect
previously unknown malware. There is a work around for this detection technique for
a patient attacker to evade the detection. This can be done by being able to make
an anomaly appear to be normal. This detection technique alone is not enough to
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detect the virus. It is usually combined with signature based detection technique.
2.2.4 Statistical based detection
The most common approach like signature based detection technique cannot be
used in the case of malwares which are metamorphic in nature. This is because, these
metamorphic malwares evade signature detection by morphing their code. These
metamorphic malwares can vary from each other to a vast extent. Yet some of
the statistics of the metamorphic malwares remains unchanged to support its actual
functionality.
2.2.4.1 Hidden Morkov Model based detection
Hidden Markov Models(HMMs) [13] can be defined as statistical Markov models
in which the system being modeled is assumed to be a Markov process with un-
observed(hidden) state. HMMs are commonly used for statistical pattern analysis.
They are especially known for their applications like speech recognition [23], malware
detection and biological sequence analysis [16]. They are also used to detect software
piracy [15] and also in protein modeling [16].
2.2.5 Similarity based detection
This detection technique is used in detecting metamorphic malware. It works as
follows. It first finds the characteristics that are common to members of a particular
metamorphic family. Once we know what the common characteristics are, we can use
them to detect metamorphic virus which belonging to the same family.
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2.3 Overview of applets
There are two different forms of Java programs. They are Java applications and
Java applets [4]. The Java applications run on their own. The Java applets run inside
a web page. It is a small application, written in Java programming language and is
sent to users in the bytecode form.
When we invoke a Java applet, it gets executed in a Java Virtual Machine(JVM),
in a process which is separate from the web browser. When it gets executed, the
executable code of the applet gets downloaded to your local system. The web page
along with the applet, arrives from the server. It is then executed on the local
system [32] by the browser. This supports the web page to have dynamic features.
Applets can showcase dynamic graphics on the web page as well. It also lets the user
to interact with it. When user interacts with applets, it makes a connection back to
the server to query the database accordingly.
The web browser provides the needed infrastructure to support the applet and
to help its execution. Applet is platform independent. This is because, the environ-
ment provided by the browser acts like an insulation shield for the applets from the
underlying operating system. This feature allows the applet to execute on any plat-
form in which the browser is Java-enabled. Dealing with applets is simple because
their code is compact. Also, standard libraries are provided on client platform such
as libraries to access graphical user interface and network access. So only the code
which is unique to applet needs to be transferred across the Internet. Simple example
of an applet is as shown in Figure 1.
There are three main parts in the program shown in Figure 1. Import statements,
class declaration and custom method (paint method). They are discussed in the
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import java.awt.*;
import javax.swing.*;
public class JavaApplet extends JApplet {
public void paint(Graphics g) {
super.paint(g);
g.drawString("The Java Applet", 30,20);
}
}
Figure 1: Simple example of an applet
subsequent subsections.
2.3.1 Import statements
The first two line in the Figure 1 contains import statements. The importance
of these statements are, they allow reuse of the code which already exists and hence
we need not reinvent the wheel again. There are a lot of standard classes provided
by Java distribution. They are called as Java application programming interface. For
instance, if we want to create an applet and want to display the text on the screen,
then there is an existing code to draw things on the screen. We can use that class by
referencing it.
The ’Graphic’ class is the example here. When the compiler looks for Graph-
ics.class file, it needs to know where it is. So, we need to explicitly tell the compiler
as to where it should look for, by using import statement. Here we are specifying
that it is in java.awk package.
JApplet class can be found in javax.swing package. So the second import state-
ment indicates the compiler that, it should look for classes in that package to get the
code related to JApplet. This has the code to display the output within a web page.
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2.3.2 Class declaration
Every classes that we create will need a class declaration. In the example above
the name of the class is JavaApplet.
Because we are programming an applet, it is necessary that we have to first
specify that our class is an applet. For that, our class should extend the JApplet
class. By doing this we inherit the applet functionality without rewriting the entire
code to make an applet. It is important that the applet has public access specifier to
ensure that we can run the program directly since applets do not have main function.
2.3.3 Custom method
The core of the program lies at the paint method in the above example. Here,
we are drawing the text ”The Java Apple” inside our applet. The Graphics class helps
accomplish this task.
If we have to use the Graphics class, first we need to declare a variable reference
for it. In the example above we use the variable g. Now we can make a call to
the methods on this object as g.<methodName>, where <methodName> refers to
the name of the method in that class. In our example we have used the method
drawString. This method called with Graphics object prints the text. When this
method is being called, we are supposed to pass some paramethers. The parameters
of drawString in our example are as follows: First, ”The Java Apple”, it is the text
that needs to be printed. Second, 30, it is the x coordinate of where we want the text
to be drawn. Third, 20, it is the corresponding y coordinate to draw the text. The
super keyword in the example above refers to the parent class. It forces the applet to
first draw itself before executing the drawing code.
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2.3.4 Essential of applets
The essential requirement for an applet to run is HTML file [4]. It is required for
displaying the applets. Applets are supposed to be embedded inside the web pages.
This part of the code needs to be in a different file from that of the .java file which
has the actual source code for the applets. Figure 2 shows the code to get our applet
to display.
<html>
<body>
<applet code="JavaApplet.class" width=400 height=500>
</applet>
</body>
</html>
Figure 2: HTML code to display the applet
2.4 Executing the applet
To execute the applet, open any text editor and copy the applet described in
section 2.3. Save the file as JavaApplet.java. The name of the file should be same
as class name. Compile this java program. The java compiler javac is being used.
Use the the command: javac JavaApplet.java. When the source code is run through
the compiler without any errors, we get a bytecode file JavaApplet.class. Java applet
execution method is different from that of the method used to run a Java application
program. There are two ways to run a Java applet. One way is by using Java
compatible web browser. The other one is by using Applet Viewer which will be
included with the JDK.
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2.4.1 Using Java compatible web browser
Open any of the text editors, for example, notepad. Type the html code de-
scribed in section 2.3.4. Here the width and height correspond to your output applet
window size. Save the file as html file in the same location as where we have saved
JavaApplet.java file. If any other location is preferred, then we have to give the abso-
lute path as the value for ’code’ attribute which is used with the tag ’applet’. After
the html file has been saved, open it with any Java compatible web browser. We will
be able to see the applet in that browser.
2.4.2 Using applet viewer
Usually, JDK contains an Applet Viewer for the purpose of viewing applets. For
executing the applet using this method, just add the applet tag containing statement
in Figure 2 just before the class in the java program as shown in Figure 3.
import java.awt.*;
import javax.swing.*;
/* <applet code="JavaApplet.class" width=400 height=500> */
public class JavaApplet extends JApplet {
public void paint(Graphics g) {
super.paint(g);
g.drawString("The Java Applet", 30,20);
}
}
Figure 3: Inserting applet tag in Java code
After adding the applet tag line in Figure 3, save and compile it. After the com-
pilation is successful, type ”appletviewer JavaApplet.java” at the command prompt
to run the applet.
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CHAPTER 3
Malware Detection Using Hidden Markov Models
Markov model is usually used to model a system which keeps changing its states
randomly. It follows Markov property which assumes that the future states of the
system depends only on the current state and not on any other sequence of events
which has occurred before. In this model, the states are visible. On the other hand,
the states of HMM are not directly observable. The HMM models a state machine
where each state is assigned the probability of observing a set of observation symbols.
Also the transition from one state to another have fixed probabilities. The HMM is
considered to be a machine learning model where we can train it, so that it represent
a particular set of data, by using some observation sequences of that data, so that
it will be able to identify or match an observation sequence in future for a new set
of data tested against a trained HMM to find the probability of occurrence of such a
sequence. If the probability obtained is more, it implies that the observation sequence
is almost similar to the training sequences. We use the notation in Table 1 to describe
an HMM [27].
We can define an HMM with the help of the matrices 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 as follows:
𝜆 = (𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋). Here the matrices 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝜋 are row-stochastic. That means, each
of the element in the matrix is a probability and sum of all the elements in each row
of the matrix will sum to 1. This implies that each row is a probability distribution.
Figure 4 illustrates the generic form of HMM.
Here the state of HMM at any point of time 𝑡 is represented by 𝑋𝑡. Also the
observation at any point of time 𝑡 is represented by 𝒪𝑡. In the figure, the part above
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Table 1: Hidden Markov Model notation
notation explanation
𝑇 length of the observation sequence
𝑁 number of states in the model
𝑀 number of observation symbols
𝑄 distinct states of the Markov process, 𝑞0, 𝑞1, . . . , 𝑞𝑁−1
𝑉 possible observations, assumed to be 0, 1, . . . ,𝑀 − 1
𝐴 state transition probabilities
𝐵 observation probability matrix
𝜋 initial state distribution
𝒪 observation sequence, 𝒪0,𝒪1, . . . ,𝒪𝑇−1
𝒪0 𝒪1 𝒪2 · · · 𝒪𝑇−1
𝑋0 𝑋1 𝑋2 · · · 𝑋𝑇−1𝐴 𝐴 𝐴 𝐴
𝐵 𝐵 𝐵 𝐵
Figure 4: Illustration of HMM
the dashed line represents the hidden part. Here the 𝐴 matrix drives the (hidden)
Markov process, where as the 𝐵 matrix relates the observations to the hidden states.
3.1 Problems solved using HMMs
First Problem For a model 𝜆 = (𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋), given an observation sequence 𝒪, we
have to find 𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆). Here, given the model, we want to find out the likelihood
of the occurrence of the observed sequence 𝒪. That is, the observation sequence
given is scored against the trained model to see if it fits the given model [27].
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Second Problem Given a model 𝜆 = (𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋) and an observation sequence 𝒪, we
need to find out an optimal state sequence for the Markov process. By doing
this, we will be actually uncovering the hidden part of the HMM [27].
Third Problem Given an observation sequence 𝒪, the dimensions 𝑁 and 𝑀 , we
need to find a model 𝜆 in such a way that it maximizes the probability of
occurrence of 𝒪. That is, we need to build the model in order to best fit an
observation sequence [27].
In the analysis of malicious Java applets we use the algorithm implementation
for the first problem discussed above. Here, we train the HMM to represent the
sequencet of bytecodes, which is obtained from the malicious Java applets. Then the
resulting model is used to score other malware or benign samples against this model.
The solutions for the above three problems discussed are obtained using the
Forward algorithm, the Backward algorithm and the Baum-Welch re-estimation al-
gorithm.
The forward algorithm [27], also called as 𝛼-pass is used to find the probability of
occurrence of the sequence given the model, referred as 𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆). It works as follows:
For 𝑡 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, define
𝛼𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝒪0,𝒪1, . . . ,𝒪𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖|𝜆)
Then the probability of the partial observation sequence up to time t is given by,
𝛼𝑡(𝑖), where the underlying Markov process is in state 𝑞𝑖 at time 𝑡.
Here, 𝛼𝑡(𝑖) can be computed recursively as follows [27]:
1. Let 𝛼0(𝑖) = 𝜋𝑖𝑏𝑖(𝒪0) for 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1
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2. For 𝑡 = 1, 2, . . . , 𝑇 − 1 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, compute
𝛼𝑡(𝑖) =
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑗=0
𝛼𝑡−1(𝑗)𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑖(𝒪𝑡)
3. Clearly we know that, 𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆) =∑︀𝑁−1𝑖=0 𝛼𝑇−1(𝑖).
The backward algorithm [27], also called as 𝛽-pass is used to determine a most
likely optimal state sequence. It works similar to 𝛼-pass, except for the part that
it starts at the end and it works backwards to the beginning. This algorithm is as
follows. For, 𝑡 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, define
𝛽𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝒪𝑡+1,𝒪𝑡+2, . . . ,𝒪𝑇−1|𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖, 𝜆)
Then 𝛽𝑡(𝑖) can be computed as follows [27]:
1. Let 𝛽𝑇−1(𝑖) = 1, for 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1.
2. For 𝑡 = 𝑇 − 2, 𝑇 − 3, . . . , 0 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 compute
𝛽𝑡(𝑖) =
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗(𝒪𝑡+1)𝛽𝑡+1(𝑗)
For 𝑡 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑇 − 2 and 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, define
𝛾𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑃 (𝑥𝑡 = 𝑞𝑖|𝒪, 𝜆)
The relative probability up to time t is given by
𝛾𝑡(𝑖) = 𝛼𝑡(𝑖)𝛽𝑡(𝑖)/𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆)
From the above definition of 𝛾𝑡(𝑖), we can say that, the most likely state any
time 𝑡 is the state for which 𝛾𝑡(𝑖) is maximum.
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Baum-Welch algorithm helps in continuously re-estimating the parameters 𝐴,
𝐵 and 𝜋. Here we want to adjust the model parameters so that it best fits the
observations. The size of the matrices are constant. That is, the number of states
𝑁 and number of unique observation symbols 𝑀 are fixed. However, we can change
other elements like 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 such that it follows row stochastic condition. The
algorithm is as follows:
1. Initialize the model elements 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 with values which might be a reason-
able guess or any random values. For instance,
𝜋 ≈ 1/𝑁,𝐴𝑖𝑗 ≈ 1/𝑁,𝐵𝑖𝑗 ≈ 1/𝑀
2. Now compute the values of the elements 𝛼𝑡(𝑖), 𝛽𝑡(𝑖), 𝛾𝑡(𝑖) as seen before. Also
compute 𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) which is referred to as a di-gamma. It can be defined in terms
of all these elements as follows:
𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝛼𝑡(𝑖)𝑎𝑖𝑗𝑏𝑗(𝒪𝑡+1)𝛽𝑡+1(𝑗)/𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆)
The relation between 𝛾𝑡(𝑖) and 𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗) is:
𝛾𝑡(𝑖) =
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑗=0
𝛾𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)
3. Verify that model 𝜆 = (𝐴,𝐵, 𝜋) can be re-estimated as follow:
For 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 let,
𝜋𝑖 = 𝜆0(𝑖)
For 𝑖 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 and 𝑗 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1, compute
𝑎𝑖𝑗 =
𝑇−2∑︁
𝑡=0
𝜆𝑡(𝑖, 𝑗)/
𝑇−2∑︁
𝑡=0
𝜆𝑡(𝑖)
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For 𝑗 = 0, 1, . . . , 𝑁 − 1 and 𝑘 = 0, 1, . . . ,𝑀 − 1, compute
𝑏𝑗(𝑘) =
∑︁
𝑡=0,1,...,𝑇−1,𝒪𝑡=𝑘
𝛾𝑡(𝑗)/
𝑇−2∑︁
𝑡=0
𝛾𝑡(𝑗)
4. if value of 𝑃 (𝒪|𝜆) increases, then go to step 3 and repeat the process.
3.2 Malware detection using HMMs
First the model is trained for a particular sequence. In this project it is trained
for a sequence of bytecodes extracted from malicious Java applets. By training the
HMM we can differentiate between malware and benign data-sets. Any new data
set is tested against this trained model. The scores of these benign and malicious
data-sets are plotted on a graph and we can see that there is a range of values for
which the benign and malicious data-sets do not overlap, this is called the threshold.
By using this, malicious data-sets can be separated from those of benign data-sets.
The benign file scores and malicious files scores are used to plot Area Under
Curve (AUC) [5]. This AUC will server as our measure of success.
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CHAPTER 4
Code Obfuscation
In the internet today we can find many exploit kits which tries to exploit the
Java Runtime Environment. Java by itself is the main target when considering the
exploits of the web. To exploit it, embed a malicious Java applet inside the web page
which when retrieved form the server by the browser, gets downloaded and executed.
These malicious Java applets will often be obfuscated to a higher degree so that it
evades the signature based detection technique which is used as a technique to detect
viruses in most of the antivirus software.
According to the paper [12], if we want to detect the malware which possess
obfuscation of its source code, the approach that gives significant results is obtained
when performed the dynamic analysis of those samples.
According to the research and experiments done in this project, static analysis
using Hidden Markov Model performs better compared to the results of dynamic
analysis which is done using HoneyAgent despite various obfuscation techniques used.
In the field of software, obfuscation [21] means deliberately making the code in
such a way that, it would be difficult to understand by the humans. We have seen that
there are a lot of software which are distributed in executable form. These software
can be reverse engineered to find out the vulnerabilities in the application when
utilized wisely can cause security breaches. By performing reverse engineering, we
can obtain the assembly code from the machine code by the process of disassembling.
Various decompilation steps may follow this process to obtain high-level source code
from the assembly code.
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If we have to complicate this reverse engineering process with respect to Java ap-
plets, then the bytecodes of Java applets can be obfuscated [6] using various tools [17].
Malicious applets use obfuscation to evade detection by signature based technique
(different kinds of virus detection methods are discussed in next chapter).
Also the problem of reverse engineering can be solved by encrypting the software
and decrypting it when its executed [3] or we can also use specialized hardware [19]
for this purpose. This approach is effective, but comes with an overhead with respect
to performance. Another approach would be to perform code obfuscation.
4.1 Goal of code obfuscation
The goal of code obfuscation is to avoid attacks due to reverse engineering. This
can by achieved by makes reconstruction of high-level abstracts difficult and compli-
cated through obfuscation. Section 4.3 gives common code obfuscation techniques
used by malwares.
4.2 Difference between compilation and reverse engineering
Compilation is the process of converting the source code into machine code. It
involves many steps where each of these steps produces lower-level representations.
Reverse engineering is the process of obtaining high level code similar to source
code from machine code. We can broadly divide this process into two steps. Fist one is
disassembly. Here we can get assembly code from the machine code of the executable.
The second one is decompilation. Here high-level constructs of the software is obtained
from the assembly code.
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4.3 Code obfuscation techniques in viruses
Code obfuscation is a technique to produce different versions of the same virus
so that it can break the signature of that particular virus and hence can evade the
signature detection technique used. Hence virus developers commonly performs code
obfuscation techniques to avoid detection.
There might be cases where this has worked the other way round. That is, where
the implementation of obfuscation techniques helps in detecting the virus. This is
possible if there is excess of obfuscation involved. The following subsections explains
the techniques used to achieve code obfuscation.
4.3.1 Instruction reordering
In this method, as the name says, code obfuscation is caused by reordering the
instructions in random way. This might lead to the concern of control flow. It is
taken care by using labels and inserting jump instructions as and where it is needed,
so that previous control flow is maintained. Thus obfuscation is achieved here without
actually changing the program flow. Since reordering is involved here, it can lead to
breaking of the signature. Suppose if there is a lot of reordering, then we can see more
umber of jump instructions. The malware detector may consider this as abnormal
behavior and detect is as virus.
4.3.2 Subroutine reordering
This is similar to the instruction reordering described in the above section. Here,
instead of instructions being reordered, the whole subroutine will be reordered and
the control flow of source code would be maintained as before, again by the use of
labels and jump statements.
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4.3.3 Interchangeable instructions
Here, some of the instructions are being replaced by its equivalent instructions.
Here equivalent instruction implies the instructions with similar functionality. This
method produces little of metamorphism as the opcode sequence would be different
because of the substitution. This method will manage to evade signature detection
technique.
4.3.4 Dead code insertion or garbage instructions
The dead code or the garbage instructions will have no effect on the functionality
of the program under execution. This can be done by simply inserting dead code or
garbage code between the lines of the actual code which contribute for the function-
ality of the program. Here too much of dead code or garbage code insertion is done
is also a problem. It should be done within in the limits of threshold value otherwise,
it will be detected by the malware detectors.
4.3.5 Swapping of registers
Here the registers are substituted with registers which are equivalent. Here again
the idea is to attempt to obtain different opcode sequence and hence evade the sig-
nature based detection technique.
Dynamic analysis of Java applets using HoneyAgent, bypasses all the usual obfus-
cation techniques. Also we can see that all of these obfuscation techniques described
above are currently being used in the wild. As a result of this, it indicates that static
analysis might not be reliable in detect malicious activity in recent Java applets.
Moreover, obfuscations can be used in benign samples as well, the presence of code
obfuscation alone might not be able to conclude that an applet is malicious.
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CHAPTER 5
Static and Dynamic Analysis
In this chapter we discuss what is static analysis and dynamic analysis [9]. What
are the advantages and disadvantages of each of it [9] and the reason for choosing
static analysis for this project.
5.1 Overview of static and dynamic analysis
Static and dynamic analyses emerged from diverse groups and advanced along
in parallel however in separate tracks. They have been seen as different areas with
researchers expertised in one area or the other.
Static analysis is analyzing and evaluating the application(its code) without
actually running it. It inspects the source code and reasons out any behavior that
might emerge at run-time. A standard example of static analyses is the compiler
optimization [10]. Static analysis works by creating a model which represents the
state of the program, then deciding how the program responds to these states. Since
there are a numerous way of executing a program, the model is used to keep record
of multiple different possible states.
Dynamic analysis is analyzing and evaluating the application at run-time
which performs by executing a program and observing the executions. For instance,
testing and profiling are dynamic analyses [10]. In dynamic analysis there is less
overhead because there is no approximation needed to be done. Here the analysis are
used to find the actual, exact run-time behavior of the program.
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5.1.1 Primary advantage of dynamic analysis
It uncovers very minute defects, the cause of which would be too complex to be
caught by static analysis. The main goal of dynamic analysis is to find the errors and
to debug them. It has an important role in security assurance.
5.1.2 Primary advantage of static analysis
It analyzes all the paths and values of the variables that could be possible to be
taken during execution and not just those paths and values that would be taken when
the program is invoked. Thus we can see that practically, static analysis is capable of
revealing errors that may not have been found out with dynamic analysis until weeks,
months or years. This part of static analysis is particularly significant in security
assurance since any attack related to security is done by running the application in
unforeseen and untested ways.
Furthermore, dynamic analysis takes lesser time and can be done as fast as program
execution. Some static analyses do run comparatively faster, but in general scenario,
getting accurate results takes a lot of computation and hence more time, especially
when the program we are analyzing is very large.
The disadvantage of dynamic analysis is that from its outcomes we can not
generalize the results for the future executions. Also it has some overhead with
respect to run-time [31]. With this into considerations we can say that static analysis
is more practical and thus more efficient. Hence we have chosen static analysis as
the method to detect malicious java applets and compared the results with dynamic
analysis in [12].
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5.2 Dynamic analysis of Java applets
According to previous research [12] HoneyAgent has been introduced which per-
forms dynamic analysis of Java applets by overcoming the common obfuscation tech-
niques used. This allows for faster detection of malicious behavior.
In recent approaches [26], to reliably find the exploits caused by obfuscation, the
run-time behavior of the applications are preferred to static analysis. There are a
lot of tools that are used to inspect the web pages with the help of JavaScript, to
examine the PDF documents [26] or Flash programs [11] which are inserted in a web
page.
5.2.1 Features of HoneyAgent
The features of HoneyAgent [12] are as follows. It is intended to investigate the
run-time behavior of Java applets. It does it by observing how Java applets interact
with the default Java Run-time Environment when it is executed. As a result of
this, it can detect any operations like file downloads, changes in the file system or
even process creation. By intercepting the function calls made when the program is
in execution, honey agent safeguards its host system by preventing any changes due
to malicious activity. Yet it remains invisible during the process of analyzing the
applets. HoneyAgent is capable of identifying malicious Java applets independently
without the help of human hands just by applying little of heuristics on the run-time
behavior that is observed.
5.2.2 Detection performance of HoneyAgent
Experiments are performed using a total of three sets of Java applets of which two
of them are malicious and another set is non-malicious. When the dynamic analysis
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was done using HoneyAgent, it was able to detect 96% of malicious samples correctly
as malicious, without any false positives for the benign Java applets.
5.2.3 Preventing detection
Malicious applets, to evade the signature based technique of detection, uses code
obfuscation to modify the binary footprint of the file. The ways of obfuscation is
previously discussed in Chapter 4. These techniques can be used at bytecode level
to prevent bytecode from being decompiled [7]. Thus we cannot apply the static
analysis method which is present currently based on decompilation [25]. According
to previous research [12] it states that code obfuscation is the main reason because
of which static analysis does not give better and efficient results.
Also there might be function calls that are encrypted, which will get decrypted
at run-time. This makes it very hard to detect the malicious activity of an applet
using static analysis techniques.
5.2.4 Requirements to detect malicious behavior at runtime
At run-time the code in examination interacts with the run-time environment.
This is the major challenge in dynamic analysis of Java applets. Therefore, to simulate
and observe the malicious behavior it is necessary for us to provide an environment
which is similar to the one an applet would need on a system which is vulnerable.
As well it is necessary to hide the code which is used for analysis purpose as far as
possible.
On the contrary, providing an environment is not necessary in static analysis since
the code will not be executed, instead the code would just be statically analyzed.
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5.3 Functionality of HoneyAgent
HoneyAgent has several functionalities [12]. The subsequent subsections gives a
brief description of them all.
5.3.1 Bytecode instrumentation
One of the features of Java’s common security component is verification of the
bytecodes. The purpose of this is, it processes the bytecodes even before it is fed into
JVM. If there is any loophole in the verification part of the bytecode, then can in
some cases cause invalid bytecodes to be fed into JVM. This provides an opportunity
for malicious Java applets to perform malicious activity.
Now with newer Java versions which have improved version of bytecode verifier
are capable of detecting invalid bytecode or its sequence thus avoid the execution of
that part of the code which is flagged invalid in the JVM. Because of this feature,
HoneyAgent does not get to analyze the complete behavior of the respective applet.
But HoneyAgent overcomes this by instrumenting the bytecodes(replaces the invalid
or malicious part of bytecodes with valid ones) of the Java applets even before it is
checked by the Java’s security verifier.
5.3.2 Determining dynamic run-time interception
HoneyAgent does run-time analysis by intercepting some of the system calls made
to the API methods. This is done by observing the applet especially the stack frame
content at the time of execution. This leads the dynamic run-time analysis to explain
the behavior of the applets which were examined without the overhead of run-time
which comes into picture due to breaking of the method calls.
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5.3.3 Detecting malicious behavior
As we have seen before, HoneyAgent does dynamic run-time analysis of Java
applets and finds out from their activity or behavior if they are malicious or benign.
This leads to the need for defining what kind of behavior is actually considered as
malicious. Usually the applet data-sets are run inside a sandbox, thus restricting its
interaction with the host. Malicious applets here tries to interact with the host. There
are a number of interactions that these applets can try to perform. Thus we can say
that an applet is malicious if it is trying to do some activities which are prohibited.
Following is the list of prohibited activities [29] which when performed is consid-
ered as malicious. If the data-set tries to access resources of the clients, for instance,
file system. If the sample tries to download or get some contents form third-party
server. If it tries to load the native library files. If it tries to modify or disable the
security manager of the system. It also should not try to create a class loader or read
some of the properties which are considered restricted.
5.4 Drawback of HoneyAgent
There are security concerns when dynamically analyzing applets using HoneyA-
gent [12]. There are limitations when compared to other dynamic analysis per-
formed [12]. The subsequent subsections gives an outline on all these drawbacks.
5.4.1 Security
When we are dynamically analyzing applets with the help of HoneyAgent they
will be interpreted by a JVM which is deployed on the actual host. Because of this,
there is a possibility that this JVM is vulnerable to the malicious activities performed
by the applets in execution.
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5.4.2 Limitation
Major drawback of HoneyAgent compared with other approaches of detecting
malicious Java applets is that, only the current path of execution is being observed
here. There might be other existing functionality which might lead to malicious
behavior that is not being used by applet at current execution which might go unob-
served during the run-time analysis.
5.4.3 Evasion
During execution of applets, they can try to see if they are analyzed by HoneyA-
gent. If they detect the present of it, the applets might try to suppress its malicious
activity. The common place where the applets looks for the agent is the current stack
trace.
5.4.4 Specific data-set
In the previous research using HoneyAgent only unsigned applets are considered
for analysis purpose. This is because the applets which are signed with a valid cer-
tificates executes without any concern. It will not have any kind of restrictions. In
this case applets execution behavior is similar to that of a typical Java application.
Hence these applets which are signed are allowed to perform any activity which we
considered prohibited in the previous section. Because of this feature, it gets difficult
to distinguish between malicious and non-malicious applet using HoneyAgent. Thus
they have considered only unsigned applets.
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5.5 Data-set
One set of data-set used in dynamic analysis of Java applets using HoneyA-
gent are downloaded from Virustotal website. The other set is taken from Contagio
malware dump. For the purpose of static analysis, same set of data is being used.
5.6 Detection rate
HoneyAgent was able to successfully determine malicious activity in 94% of all
samples which were taken from the Contagio data-set and 97% in the Virustotal data-
set. This was done without generating any false positives for the applets which are
benign. On an average, the detection rate of malicious Java applets comes up to 96%
.
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CHAPTER 6
Experimental Results
Java applets consists of compiled Java classes which are usually bundled in a jar
archive similar to any usual Java application. We carried out static analysis on these
jar archives of malicious Java applets with Hidden Markov Model using the same data
sets as used in dynamic analysis using HoneyAgent [12], discussed in Chapter 5.
Using Hidden Markov Model discussed in Chapter 3, we train the model for the
particular sequence. Here the sequence would be the sequence of bytecodes appearing
in the class files present in the jar archive corresponding to the malicious Java applets.
That is, the applets we work on are in the form of .jar files from which we extract the
contents which are a set of .class files. From these .class files we extract the bytecodes
and use it to train the model.
6.1 Extracting the contents of jar file
The command which is used in extracting the components of JAR file is
jar xf <jar-file>
The options and arguments in this command line are as follows. x, it is an option
which is used to extract the jar files. f, it is an option which says that the name of
the jar file whose contents are to be extracted has to be given in the command line.
jar-file, is an argument that indicates the filename of the jar file. We can also give a
path to the filename as a value for this argument.
In the above command, order in which the options x and f are used will not
matter. But we have to make sure that they are not joined together, that is there is a
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space between them. The Jar tool works by making copies of the required files when
you are extracting the files. It then writes the copied files to the current directory.
Here the original JAR file is not modified.
6.2 The bytecodes
We know that Java source code is compiled into bytecodes, which are present
in the class file. Bytecodes are the key reason for Java’s platform independence.
From the section 6.1 we know how to get the class files from the jar archives which
correspond to Java applets.
Now, We can use javap tool which acts as a disassembler for one or more Java
class files to view the bytecodes. The output of this command depends on the options
that are used with it.
We use the following command with the option ’c’.
javap -c <class-file-name>.class
The options and arguments in this command line are as follows: ⁀+extitc, this option
prints out the instructions for each of the methods in the class. These instructions
consists of Java bytecodes. Basically this option is used for printing the disassembled
code. class-file-name, this argument is name of the class file and it must have the
extension of .class. Figure 5 is the screen-shot of how the output looks when you run
the above command. The output of javap is always printed to stdout.
First capture the output of javap -c into a text file. From the above figure we
know that along with bytecodes, we do get other information as well. Using simple
python script with the help of regular expression we can extract just the bytecodes
and copy it to a file. These files containing bytecodes are used in training the HMM,
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Figure 5: Output from javap -c JavaApp.class
i.e., for the static analysis of the applets.
So now, for each class file we have a file which contains only its corresponding
bytecodes (no other information except bytecodes).
6.3 Results using Contagio data-set
With this experiment, the AUC obtained from static analysis of the data-set from
Contagio malware dump is 0.95156 . It is as shown in the Figure 6. In comparison,
dynamic analysis using HoneyAgent [12] was able to successfully detect malicious
behavior in 94% of all samples from the Contagio data set without generating any
false positives for the benign applets. This implies that in this scenario, static analysis
is efficient and gives better result than dynamic analysis.
6.4 Results using Virustotal data-set
The AUC obtained from static analysis of the data-set from VirusTotal website is
0.77 .It is as shown in the Figure 7. In comparision, dynamic analysis using HoneyA-
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Figure 6: AUC for data-set from Cantagio website
gent [12] was able to successfully detect malicious behavior in 97% of the Virustotal
data set without generating any false positives for the benign applets. Assumption
for the difference here in static analysis is, a lot of dead code being injected or more
percentage of code obfuscation in the data-set downloaded from Virustotal, because
of which adjacency of bytecodes will differ a lot.
So the total result of 94% detection rate with respect to sample from Contagio
dump and 97% detection rate with respect to sample from Virustotal website, the
results come to total detection rate of 96% in average in dynamic analysis.
We even did analysis outside the data-set specified here. We downloaded extra
sample from VirusTotal website with the search criteria matching the previous search
as used in downloading VirusTotal data-set. We searched for ”type:jar p:+5 and
not type:android” and downloaded top 100 samples. This search implies that we are
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Figure 7: AUC for data-set from Virustotal website
searching for malicious Java applets which are detected by atleast five anti-virus and
those applications which are not android. When we did the static analysis on this
extra data-set, the AUC obtained is 0.905.
6.5 Deleting uncommon bytecodes
For the purpose of getting better results we tried training the HMM by ma-
nipulated data-set. That is, we deleted uncommon bytecodes whose frequency of
occurrence is less than or equal to different range. Table 2 gives the outcome of this
action performed on VirusTotal data-set and its graph is given in Figure 8. Table 3
and Table 4 gives the results of this action performed on Contagio data-set and extra
data sample downloaded from VirusTotal respectively. Also Figure 9 and Figure 10
gives the graphs of the data given in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively.
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Table 2: AUC after deleting uncommon bytecodes from VirusTotal data-set
Number range % removed AUC
0 0% 0.772
6 0.55% 0.795
12 1.07% 0.806
13 1.18% 0.808
14 1.25% 0.804
15 1.33% 0.8
16 1.14% 0.796
20 1.72% 0.78
30 2.56% 0.758
40 3.38% 0.725
80 5.95% 0.664
100 6.86% 0.643
400 18.42% 0.453
Figure 8: AUC after deleting uncomman bytecodes from VirusTotal sample
From this experiment we can observe that area under ROC curve (AUC) in-
creased to 0.808 after deleting bytecodes whose frequency of occurrence is less than
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Table 3: AUC after deleting uncommon bytecodes from Contagio data-set
Number range % removed AUC
0 0% 0.952
1 0.014% 0.951
2 0.06% 0.932
6 0.24% 0.926
12 0.5% 0.916
20 0.94% 0.914
50 2.26% 0.851
100 4.04% 0.789
Figure 9: AUC after deleting uncomman bytecodes from Contagio data-set
or equal to 13 in VirusTotal sample. This is the maximum that the AUC reaches,
after which there is decline in its value. With respect to data-set from Contagio, when
uncommon byecodes are deleted, there is a constant decline in the value of AUC which
was initially 0.952. Where as with the extra data-set, AUC value increases to a very
small extent to 0.91 when a very small fraction of bytecodes(0.02%) were removed.
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Table 4: AUC after deleting uncommon bytecodes from extra sample downloaded
from VirusTotal
Number range % removed AUC
0 0% 0.905
1 0.02% 0.91
2 0.08% 0.902
3 0.1% 0.901
6 0.4% 0.848
12 0.84% 0.805
20 1.56% 0.779
50 3.95% 0.697
100 6.87% 0.567
400 25.2% 0.38
Figure 10: AUC after deleting uncomman bytecodes from the extra sample down-
loaded from VirusTotal
After which we can see that there is again decrease in its value.
This shows that if we delete the uncommon bytecodes that are used in training
38
the model, the accuracy of detecting the malicious applet increases to some extent
until certain point. We can say that, this will help increase the detection rate of
malware.
Now when we compare the detection rate of malicious applets obtained from
dynamic analysis of Contagio dump which is 94% and the one with static analysis,
the AUC is 0.952. We can say that detection rate of static analysis is 95.2% and hence
with respect to this data-set static analysis performs better than dynamic analysis.
Where as with VirusTotal data-set, dynamic analysis result is 97% and static analysis
result after deleting uncommon bytecodes, the maximum AUC obtained is 0.808
and hence we can say that, detection rate of static analysis her is 80.8% . In the
static analysis done with extra data-set, the maximum AUC obtained after deleting
uncommon bytecodes is 0.91 and thus we can say that here the detection rate is 91%
. Figure 11 gives the graph of this description.
Figure 11: Comparison of static analysis results after deletion of uncommon bytecodes
with dynamic analysis results
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we presented experiments based on static analysis of malicious Java
applets using Hidden Markov Model and compared results to the dynamic analysis
when working with the same data-set as that used by dynamic analysis using Hon-
eyAgent. We also performed static analysis on extra data sample other than that used
in dynamic analysis using HoneyAgent. We also deleted uncommon bytecodes before
training the model and observed that we get better results when certain percentage
of the bytecodes are removed, compared to training the model with all the bytecodes.
Through the experiments conducted here, we can say that static analysis of
malicious Java applets in some cases give better results than dynamic analysis. Since
static analysis is better and efficient, and also gives better results, this method should
be preferred to dynamic analysis with respect to analysis of Java applets. In certain
cases static analysis might not perform better if the sample that we are using to train
the model has more of dead-code injection or a high degree of code-obfuscation due
to which bytecode adjacency might differ.
These experiments are conducted with limited set of Java applet samples. Avail-
ability of malicious Java applets data-set in the internet is very difficult. If we get
more set of samples and perform these experiments extensively on all those data-sets
and if we get good results in all of these we can say that static analysis is preferred
to dynamic analysis most of the times. So future work would be to collect more
data samples and perform the static analysis. Also in this project we have considered
static analysis only using Hidden Markov Model. We can also use other static analysis
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methods for performing the experiments. If they do not give good results, then their
scores can be combined to analyze the detection rate.
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